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According	   to	   Barry	   Stroud,	   the	   controversy	   over	   naturalism	  
ultimately	  concerns	  deep	  disagreements	  over	  what	  counts	  as	  
“natural”.	   	  However,	  he	  points	  out,	   “those	  disagreements	  are	  
not	   themselves	   to	   be	   settled	   by	   what	   can	   be	   recognized	   as	  
straightforwardly	   ‘naturalistic’	  means.	   	   So	   the	  one	   thing	   that	  
seems	   not	   to	   have	   been	   ‘naturalized’	   is	   naturalism	   itself.”	  
(1996,	   43).	   Taking	   Stroud’s	   suggestion,	   I	   will	   argue	   that	  
justifying	  belief	  in	  naturalism	  requires	  the	  epistemic	  resources	  
which	   naturalism	   repudiates,	   viz.	   that	   a	   case	   for	   naturalism	  
cannot	   be	   itself	   naturalized.	   	   The	   paper	   is	   structured	   as	  
follows.	   	   In	  Section	  (I)	   I	  will	  exhibit	   the	  central	   features	  of	  a	  
version	  of	  naturalism.	   	   In	  Section	  (II)	   I	  sketch	  a	  general	  case	  
for	  naturalism.	   	   In	  Section	  (III)	  I	  consider	  the	   justification	  of	  
belief	   in	   naturalism	   on	   an	   externalist	   conception	   of	  
justification.	   	   And	   in	   Section	   (IV)	   I	   consider	   two	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  case	  that	  resist	  “naturalization.”	  	  	  
I.	   The	  Central	  Features	  of	  Naturalism	  
	  
David	   Papineau	   suggests	   that	   for	   the	   naturalist	   “all	  
philosophical	   theorizing”	   is	   for	   the	   task	   of	   bringing	  
“coherence	  and	  order	  to	  the	  total	  set	  of	  assumptions	  we	  use	  to	  
explain	  the	  empirical	  world”	  (1993,	   1-­‐3).	   	  Furthermore,	  “there	  
is	   no	   reason	   to	   place	   even	   first	   philosophy	   outside	   science”	  
(1993,	  43).	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Laurence	  BonJour	  has	   suggested	   that	   this	   subjugation	  
of	  the	  a	  priori	  is	  motivated	  by	  a	  general	  premise,	  namely,	  that	  
rationalism	   is	   “incompatible	   with	   allegedly	   well-­‐established	  
theses	   [e.g.,	   naturalism]	   about	   the	   nature	   and	   limitations	   of	  
human	  beings	  and	  human	   intellectual	  processes”	   (1998,	   153).	  	  
Thus,	  the	  naturalist	  eschewal	  of	  genuine1	  a	  priori	  justification	  
and	  knowledge	  raises	  an	   important	  question.	   	  Can	  a	  case	  for	  
naturalism	   be	   denuded	   of	   a	   priori	   concepts	   and	   yet	   remain	  
coherent	  and	  plausible?	  	  
Here	   I	   will	   take	   naturalists	   to	   be	   committed	   to	   the	  
following	  set	  of	  propositions	  (N):	  
	  
a)  All	   facts	   are	   physical	   facts,	   capable	   of	   third-­‐person	  
definite	  description.	  	  
b)  Empirical	  knowledge	  is	  knowledge	  simpliciter.	  
c)  All	  modes	  of	   knowledge	   are	   empirical	   or	   reducible	   to	  
empirical	  modes.	  
d)  There	  is	  no	  genuine	  a	  priori	  justification	  or	  knowledge.	  	  	  
	  
Concerning	  (d),	  the	  naturalist	  claims	  that	  all	  cases	  of	  apparent	  
a	  priori	  truth	  can	  be	  either	  reduced	  to	  “safe”	  analytic	  truths	  or	  
eliminated	  altogether.	   	  In	  the	  former	  case,	  a	  priori	   truths	  are	  
reduced	   to	   analytical	   truths	   that	   are	   constituents	   of	  
contingent	   linguistic	   conventions.	   	   In	   either	   case,	   genuine	  a	  
priori	   truths	   are	   considered	   unnecessary	   to	   account	   for	   our	  
knowledge	  about	  the	  world.	  
I	   have	   excluded	   an	   externalist	   approach	   to	  
epistemology	  from	  my	  characterization	  of	  naturalism	  in	  order	  
to	   consider	   both	   externalist	   and	   internalist	   approaches	   to	  
establishing	  a	  case	  for	  naturalism.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  
the	   commitments	   of	   naturalism	   establish	   the	   parameters	  
within	   which	   the	   naturalist	   case	   must	   be	   made.	   	   Thus,	   for	  
example,	  a	  case	  for	  naturalism	  cannot	  employ	  genuine	  a	  priori	  
justification	  or	  knowledge.	  	  	  
II.	   A	  General	  Case	  for	  Naturalism	  
	  
It	  is	  doubtful	  that	  there	  is	  a	  specific	  case	  for	  naturalism	  
that	  would	  be	  accepted	  by	  all	  naturalists.	  	  Fortunately,	  here	  it	  
will	   suffice	   to	   utilize	   a	   standard	   form	   of	   argument,	   modus	  
ponens,	   where	   P	   represents	   the	   set	   of	   premises	   and	   N	  
                                                            
1	  As	  discussed	  below,	  “genuine”	  a	  priori	  justification	  or	  knowledge	  cannot	  be	  
eliminated	  or	  reduced	  to	  “mere”	  analyticity.	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represents	   the	   set	   of	   naturalistic	   tenets	   constituting	   the	  
conclusion.	   	   Thus,	   we	   may	   sketch	   a	   general	   case	   for	  
naturalism	  (NC):	  	  	  
	  
(1)  If	  P,	  then	  N.	  	  	  
(2)  P	  
(3)  Therefore	  N.	  	  	  
	  
	   Of	  course,	  an	  argument	  for	  naturalism	  need	  not	  deploy	  
modus	   tollens.	   	   However,	   since	   the	   failure	   of	   any	   one	  
argument	  for	  naturalism	  would	  not	  constitute	  a	  refutation	  of	  
naturalism,	  NC,	  as	  a	  general	  sketch,	  is	  intended	  to	  encompass	  
any	  argument	  for	  naturalism	  (since	  it	  seems	  that	  an	  argument	  
in	   any	   other	   logical	   form	   could	   be	   translated	   into	   modus	  
ponens).	   	   Hence,	   if	   NC	   fails,	   there	   can	   be	   no	   successful	  
argument	   for	   naturalism.	   	   In	   addition,	   the	   use	   of	   modus	  
ponens	  allows	  for	  some	  general	  observations	  that	  would	  seem	  
true	  of	  any	  valid	  argument.	  	  Such	  observations	  will	  illuminate	  
essential	   characteristics	   of	   NC	   that	   seem	   to	   be	   a	   priori	   in	  
character,	  and	  thus	  must	  be	  naturalizable	  for	  NC	  to	  avoid	  self-­‐
refutation.	  	  	  
	  
III.	   Externalist	  Justification	  and	  Belief	  in	  Naturalism	  
	  
The	   challenge	   the	   naturalist	   faces	   is	   justifying	   every	  
requisite	   aspect	   of	   NC.	   	   Obviously,	   for	   NC	   to	   be	   valid,	   the	  
premises	  must	  entail	  or	  probabilistically	  imply	  the	  conclusion.	  	  
Not	  so	  obvious,	  however,	  is	  the	  challenge	  for	  the	  naturalist	  to	  
justify	   that	   entailment,	   viz.	   the	   principle	   of	   modus	   ponens	  
that	   the	   premises	   exemplify	   and	   presuppose.	   	   Furthermore,	  
for	  NC	  to	  be	  sound,	   its	  premises	  must	  be	   justified—whether	  
the	  premises	   are	   deductive	   or	   inductive	   claims.	   	   Thus,	   since	  
justification	   is	   so	   important,	   it	  will	   be	   necessary	   to	   consider	  
rival	  conceptions	  of	  justification	  advanced	  by	  externalists	  and	  
internalists	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   a	   case	   for	   naturalism.	   	   While	   my	  
discussion	  must	  be	  brief,	  I	  hope	  to	  suggest	  that	  (i)	  that	  on	  an	  
externalist	   conception	   of	   justification,	   a	   person	   could	   never	  
justifiably	   believe	   that	   she	   actually	   is	   justified	   in	   believing	  
naturalism	  to	  be	   true;	   	   (ii)	   	   that	  an	  externalist	  conception	  of	  
justification	   is	   “unnatural,”	   either	   being	   itself	   an	   a	   priori	  
concept,	  or	  presupposing	  a	  priori	  concepts;	  and	  	  (iii)	  	  that,	  as	  
an	  implication	  of	  (i)	  and	  (ii),	  an	  (at	  least	  partially)	  internalist	  
conception	   of	   justification	   is	   necessary	   to	  make	   a	   case	   for	   a	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justified	  belief	   in	  naturalism—assuming	  that	  such	  a	  case	  can	  
otherwise	  be	  made.	  
On	   the	   basis	   of	   an	   externalist	   account,	   according	   to	  
which	   a	   belief	   is	   justified	   in	   virtue	   of	   there	   being	   a	   suitable	  
causal	  connection	  between	  the	  belief	  and	  the	  external	  state	  of	  
affairs	   that	   the	   belief	   is	   about,	   it	   would	   seem	   impossible	   to	  
ever	   show	   that	   belief	   in	   naturalism	   is	   actually	   justified.	   	   A	  
reliabilist,	   for	  example,	  will	  argue	  that	  belief	   in	  naturalism	  is	  
justified	  if	  a	  reliable	  process	  produces	  it.	  	  Of	  course,	  since	  it	  is	  
possible	   for	   one’s	   belief	   in	   naturalism	   to	   be	   reliably	   or	  
unreliably	  produced,	   the	   relevant	  question	   for	   an	   externalist	  
is	  whether	  one’s	  belief	  in	  naturalism	  is	  reliably	  produced.	  	  To	  
this,	   the	   reliabilist	   could	   answer	   that	   if	   a	   reliable	   process	  
produces	  one’s	  belief	  that	  one’s	  belief	  in	  naturalism	  is	  reliably	  
produced,	  then	  one	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  believing	  that	  one’s	  
belief	   in	   naturalism	   was	   justified.	   	   However,	   as	   Richard	  
Fumerton	   has	   argued,	   this	   is	   either	   circular	   or	   viciously	  
regressive	  (1995,	  175-­‐177).	  
Alternatively,	   an	   externalist	   could	   answer	   by	  
describing	  the	  nomological	  factors	  that	  generated	  one’s	  belief	  
in	  naturalism	  and	  giving	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  such	  a	  process	  
is	   appropriately	   reliable.	   	   Unfortunately,	   the	   same	   question	  
must	   be	   asked	   of	   such	   an	   account:	   	   “How	   is	   belief	   in	   this	  
account	   justified?”	   	   However,	   an	   externalist	   qua	   externalist	  
cannot	  answer,	  “Because	  it	  seems	  that	  this	  account	  constitutes	  
a	   good	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   the	   belief	   in	   naturalism	   was	  
reliably	   produced,”	   for	   such	   phenomenology	   cannot,	   on	   an	  
externalist	  account,	  contribute	  to	  justification.	  	  Thus,	  it	  seems	  
that	  an	  externalist	  is	  not	  able	  to	  establish	  actual—rather	  than	  
merely	   possible—justification	   for	   belief	   in	   naturalism.	  	  
Although	  a	  person	  might	  be	   justified	   in	  believing	  naturalism	  
to	   be	   true,	   a	   person	   could	   never	   justifiably	   believe	   that	   she	  
actually	  was	  justified	  in	  believing	  naturalism	  to	  be	  true.	  
Another	   problem	   for	   the	   naturalist	   with	   regard	   to	  
externalism	   concerns	   its	   conditional	   conception	   of	  
justification.	  	  The	  conditional	  “If	  a	  belief’s	  etiology	  is	  reliable,	  
then	  the	  belief	  is	  justified”	  is	  an	  a	  priori	  claim	  that	  in	  no	  way	  
seems	  analytically	  true.	   	  Even	  if	  the	  conditional	  was	  taken	  to	  
indicate	   a	   probabilistic	   entailment,	   attempting	   to	   justify	   the	  
conditional	  on	  empirical	  grounds	  not	  only	  leads	  to	  the	  regress	  
indicated	  above,	  but	  also	  seems	  to	  require	  the	  justification	  of	  
certain	   a	   priori	   principles	   such	   as	   the	   principle	   of	   credulity.	  	  
Thus,	   externalism	   seems	   to	   require	   genuine	   a	   priori	  
  5 
justification.	  	  This	  however,	  makes	  externalists	  and	  naturalists	  
ill-­‐suited	  allies.	  	  	  	  	  
On	  account	  of	   the	  difficulty	  of	   establishing	  NC	  on	  an	  
externalist	   conception	   of	   justification,	   I	   will	   proceed	   by	  
evaluating	  NC	   on	   a	   conception	   of	   justification	   that	   includes	  
some	  internalist	  conditions,	  such	  as	  that	  justification	  may	  be	  
a	  function	  of	  states	  cognitively	  accessible	  to	  the	  believer.	  	  
IV.	   Aspects	  of	  NC	  Which	  Resist	  Naturalization	  
	  
I	  will	  now	  consider	  two	  “unnatural”	  aspects	  of	  NC.	  	  The	  
first	   concerns	   the	   justificatory	   status	   of	   NC’s	   premises.	  	  
BonJour	   argues	   that	   the	   premises	   of	   an	   argument	   attacking	  
genuine	  a	  priori	  knowledge	  must,	  at	  pain	  of	   self-­‐defeat,	  be	  a	  
posteriori	   in	   character.	   	   Yet,	   he	   argues,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   how	  
premises	   known	   a	   posteriori	   can	   have	   any	   substantial	  
contribution	   to	   an	   argument	   against	   the	   a	   priori.	   	   While	  
unapologetical	  about	   this	   seemingly	   simple	   line	  of	  argument	  
against	   those	   who	   would	   attack	   the	   a	   priori,	   BonJour	   does	  
consider	   it	   decisive	   (1998,	   155).	   	   I	   aim	   to	   show	   just	   how	  
decisive	  it	  is.	  	  	  
The	  first	  premise	  is	  a	  conditional:	  	  if	  P	  were	  to	  obtain,	  
then	  N	  would	  obtain.	  	  What	  is	  interesting	  about	  conditionals	  
is	  that	  they	  are	  claimed	  prior	  to	  the	  fact.	  	  It	  is	  the	  entailment	  
relation	   between	   them—P	   entails	   N—that	   is	   claimed,	  
apparently,	   a	   priori.	   	   The	   question	   is	   whether	   NC	   would	  
succeed	  if	  this	  entailment	  was	  reduced	  to	  an	  analytic	  truth	  or	  
eliminated	   altogether.	   	   Whether	   this	   entailment	   is	  
understood	   probabilistically	   (i.e.,	   P	   probably	   entails	   N)	  
matters	  not,	  since	  the	  claim	  would	  still	  be	  a	  priori.	  	  Since	  the	  
entailment	   is	   necessary	   for	   a	   case	   to	   succeed,	   the	   naturalist	  
cannot	   just	   eliminate	   the	   entailment	   relation.	   	   Rather,	   she	  
must	  be	  able	  to	  reduce	  the	  entailment	  relation	  inherent	  in	  (1)	  
to	  an	  analytic	  truth.	  	  	  
The	   prospects	   for	   such	   a	   reduction	   seem	   slim.	   	   An	  
example	   of	   a	   reducible	   entailment	   relation	   is	   the	   following:	  	  
For	   any	   person	   X	   at	   time	   t,	   if	   X	   is	   a	   bachelor,	   then	   X	   is	   an	  
unmarried	  male.	  	  This	  is	  analytically	  true	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  
that,	   by	  definition,	  all	   bachelors	   are	  unmarried	  males.	   	   That	  
(1)	   will	   not	   survive	   such	   a	   reduction	   can	   be	   shown	   by	  
considering	   the	   type	   of	   content	   it	   must	   have.	   	   At	   pain	   of	  
contradicting	   the	   conclusion	   of	   NC	   (i.e.,	   that	   there	   are	   no	  
non-­‐empirical	  facts),	  P	  must	  represent	  a	  set	  of	  premises	  each	  
of	  which	  is	  a	  wholly	  empirical	  observation.	  	  However,	  by	  dint	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of	  the	  fact	  that	  empirical	  claims	  are,	  at	  their	  highest	  possible	  
generality,	   inductive	   inferences,	   empirical	   claims	   can	   never,	  
by	   themselves,	   justify	   universal	   assertions.	   	   As	   the	   bachelor	  
example	   shows,	   entailment	   relations	   may	   be	   reduced	   to	  
analytical	   truths	   when	   there	   is	   a	   presupposed	   universal	  
assertion	  (e.g.,	  all	  bachelors	  are	  unmarried	  males).	  	  To	  reduce	  
(1)	   to	   an	   analytic	   truth,	   however,	   the	   naturalist	   will	   not	   be	  
able	   to	   presuppose	   the	   universal	   claim	   that	   “all	   Ps	   entail	  N”	  
without	   begging	   the	   question.	   	   Nor	   can	   the	   naturalist	  
establish	   this	   universal	   assertion	   on	   the	   basis	   on	   empirical	  
observations,	  since,	  obviously,	  it	  will	  never	  be	  possible	  for	  her	  
to	   observe	   that	   every	   P	   entails	  N.	   	  Hence,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	  
entailment	  relation	  inherent	  in	  (1),	  if	  true,	  is	  an	  a	  priori	  claim.	  	  	  
This	  evinces	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  second	  premise	  (2).	   	   If	  
the	   premises	   in	   P	   must	   be	   empirical	   claims,	   and	   empirical	  
claims	  are	  justified	  via	  inference	  from	  empirical	  observations,	  
then	   the	  naturalist	  must	  be	  able	   to	   justify	   such	  an	   inference	  
(BonJour	   1998,	   155).	   	   The	   justification	   of	   principles	   of	  
inference,	   however,	   would	   seem	   an	   impossible	   task	   for	   the	  
empiricist	   qua	   empiricist.	   	   Hence,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   only	  
available	   justification	   for	   inductive	   inferences	   is	   a	   priori	  
justification.	  
A	   second	   aspect	   of	   NC	   to	   consider	   is	   its	   form.	   	   The	  
argument	  must	  be	  of	   a	   valid	   form	   for	   it	   to	  be	   sound.	   	  Thus,	  
implicit	  in	  the	  argument	  is	  the	  “premise”	  that	  modus	  ponens	  
is	  a	  justified	  logical	  inference.	  	  This	  premise,	  then,	  must	  itself	  
be	   justified	   naturally.	   	   For	   the	   naturalist,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
validity	   of	   modus	   ponens	   seems	   intuitively	   (i.e.,	   non-­‐
empirically)	   obvious	   in	   no	   way	   satisfies	   its	   need	   for	  
justification.	   	   Indeed,	   part	   of	  what	  must	   be	   accounted	   for	   is	  
the	   way	   in	   which	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   validity	   of	   modus	  
ponens	  seems	  intuitively	  indubitable.	  	  	  
It	   is	   difficult,	   however,	   to	   see	   how	   the	   “observation”	  
that	  modus	  ponens	  is	  a	  valid	  inference	  could	  be	  an	  empirical	  
observation.	   	   From	   merely	   reading	   the	   set	   of	   written	  
propositions	  which	  represent	  NC,	  one	  does	  not	  thereby	  “read”	  
that	  modus	   ponens	   is	   a	   valid	   argument	   form.	   	  Moreover,	   it	  
would	  not	  help	  to	  offer	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  validity	  of	  modus	  
tollens,	   since	   such	   an	   argument	   would	   itself	   assume	   the	  
validity	   of	   some	   form	   of	   inference.	   	   Thus,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	  
validity	   of	  modus	   tollens	   is	   a	   primitive	   fact	   apprehended	   by	  
the	  mind	  in	  an	  intuitive,	  non-­‐empirical	  manner.	  	  
The	  naturalist,	   however,	   has	   the	   option	  of	   construing	  
modus	   tollens	   as	   an	   analytical	   truth,	   one	   true	   by	   definition.	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Here,	  justification	  results	  from	  understanding	  the	  meaning	  of	  
a	   proposition.	   	   BonJour,	   however,	   argues	   that	   there	   is	   no	  
significant	   difference	   between	   the	   Fregean	   “definitional”	  
conception	   of	   analyticity	   and	   the	   a	   priori	   concept	   of	  
justification:	   	   in	  both	  accounts	  one	  derives	   justification	   from	  
understanding	   or	   grasping	   the	   meaning	   of	   a	   proposition.	  	  
Thus,	  what	  the	  Fregean	  conception	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  is	  how	  
we	   are	   justified	   in	   believing	   propositions	   which	   are	   true	   by	  
definition.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  intensional	  meaning	  
of	  the	  word	  “humans”	  includes	  the	  intensional	  meaning	  of	  the	  
word	   “men”	   does	   not	   explain	   how	   we	   justifiably	   know	   or	  
believe	   that	   the	   proposition	   “All	   men	   are	   humans”	   is	   true.	  	  
What	   seems	   clear	   is	   that	   this	  mode	   of	   knowledge	   is	   not	   an	  
empirical	  one.	  
Furthermore,	   the	   observation	   that	   certain	   premises	  
exemplify	   the	   modus	   ponens	   form	   is	   not	   an	   empirical	  
observation.	   	   Consider	   an	   example.	   	   Let	   the	   following	  
propositions	   represent	   a	   series	   of	   thoughts	   had	   by	   Foghorn	  
Leghorn:	  
	  
(4)  I	  dropped	  an	  egg	  on	  the	  floor.	  
(5)  All	  eggs	  dropped	  on	  the	  floor	  break.	  
(6)  Therefore,	  the	  egg	  broke.	  
	  
For	  the	  sake	  of	  argument,	  grant	  that	  both	  premises	  are	  wholly	  
justified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Foghorn’s	  empirical	  observations,	  and	  
that	  he	  did	  not	   in	  any	  way	  empirically	  verify	   the	  conclusion.	  	  
Further,	  assume	  Foghorn	  has	  studied	  logic.	   	  After	  having	  the	  
series	  of	  thoughts,	  Foghorn	  can	  reflect	  and	  thereby	  know	  
	  
(7)  that	  his	  conclusion	  (6)	  is	  justified,	  and	  
(8)  that	   his	   series	   of	   thoughts	   exemplify	   a	   valid	   form	   of	  
inference,	  namely,	  modus	  ponens.	  
	  
Obviously,	  none	  of	  the	  empirical	  facts	  he	  observed	  entail	  (8).	  	  
(As	  argued	  above,	  none	  of	  them	  would	  entail	  (7)	  either,	  since	  
(5)	   could	   not	   be	   established	   by	   empirical	   facts—but	   I	   have	  
granted	   (5)	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   argument).	   	   Thus,	   while	   the	  
knowing	  that	  (8)	   is	  not	  necessary	   for	   justifiably	  believing	  (6)	  
or	   (7),	   it	   is	   a	   distinct	   item	   of	   knowledge	   occasioned	   by	  
empirical	  facts	  but	  not	  accounted	  for	  by	  them.	  	  Thus,	  since	  no	  
amount	   of	   empirical	   observations	   will	   constitute	   the	  
observation	   that	   a	   series	   of	   thoughts	   or	   propositions	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exemplify	   modus	   ponens,	   such	   an	   observation	   is	   not	   an	  
empirical	  observation.	  	  	  
With	  regard	  to	  NC,	  for	  one	  to	  justifiably	  believe	  NC	  to	  
be	   valid,	   one	   must	   “see”	   NC	   to	   exemplify	   a	   valid	   form	   of	  
inference.	   	   However,	   since	   this	   kind	   observation	   cannot	   be	  
empirical,	   the	   validity	   for	   NC	   cannot	   derive	   from	   empirical	  
facts	   (though,	   of	   course,	   it	   may	   be	   occasioned	   by	   them).	  	  
Thus,	   to	   justifiably	   believe	   the	   form	   of	   NC	   to	   be	   valid,	   the	  
conclusion	  of	  NC	  would	  have	  to	  be	  false,	  since	  there	  must	  be	  
both	  a	  non-­‐empirical	  mode	  of	  knowledge	  and	  non-­‐empirical	  
facts	  therewith	  known.	  
Of	   course,	   the	   validity	   of	   logical	   inferences	   such	   as	  
modus	   ponens	   is	   not	   just	   “seen”	   to	   be	   merely	   true,	   but	  
necessarily	   true.	   	  We	   cannot	   conceive	   of	   any	   possible	  world	  
where	   the	  proposition	   “If	   all	  A’s	   are	   F,	   then	   some	  A’s	   are	   F”	  
would	   be	   false.	   	   The	   naturalist	  may	   respond	   in	   two	  ways	   to	  
possible-­‐world	   talk.	   	  On	  one	  hand,	   the	  naturalist	  may	   claim	  
that	   necessity	   is	   identical	   with	   facts	   about	   possible	   worlds.	  	  
According	  to	  Robinson,	  however,	  this	  “achieves	  nothing	  if	  our	  
knowledge	   of	   possible	   worlds	   rests	   entirely	   on	   a	   priori	  
intuitions	  about	  modality”	  (1993,	  10).	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  
naturalist	  might	  object	   that	  possible-­‐world	  talk	   is	  an	  a	  priori	  
enterprise,	   and	   thus	   is	   question	   begging—but	   this	   rather	  
drastic	   reply	   would	   seem	   to	   be	   a	   reductio	   of	   the	   position.	  	  
Nevertheless,	   even	   if	  we	  constrained	  our	   imagination	   to	   this	  
world,	   it	   is	   still	   inconceivable	   that	   at	   any	   time	   or	   place	   the	  
proposition	   “If	   all	   A’s	   are	   F,	   then	   some	   A’s	   are	   F”	   could	   be	  
false.	   	   Thus,	   the	   modal	   status	   of	   a	   priori	   truths	   escapes	   a	  
naturalist	  account.	  	  	  
Thus,	  we	  have	  three	  options:	  	  
	  
(a) There	  is	  no	  justification	  for	  taking	  (3)	  to	  follow	  from	  (1)	  
and	  (2).	  
(b) The	   justification	   for	   taking	   (3)	   to	   follow	   from	   (1)	   and	  
(2)	   can	   never	   be	   established,	   since	   it	   requires	   an	  
infinite	  regress	  of	  “contingently	  valid”	  inferences.	  	  
(c) The	  justification	  for	  believing	  (3)	  to	  follow	  from	  (1)	  and	  
(2)	   is	   derived	   from	   an	   a	   priori	   insight	   (say)	   into	   the	  
inconceivability	  of	  the	  contrary.	  	  	  
	  
Since	   (a)	   and	   (b)	   fail	   to	   justify	   the	   validity	   of	   (3),	   and	   (c)	  
justifies	  the	  validity	  of	  (3)	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  employing	  genuine	  a	  
priori	   justification,	   it	   seems	   that	   there	   can	   be	   no	   “natural”	  
justification	  for	  the	  validity	  of	  (3).	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   Some	   philosophers,	   however,	   attempt	   to	   deny	   the	  
apparent	   necessary	   character	   of	   an	   a	   priori	   proposition	   by	  
identifying	   the	   “necessity”	   with	   a	   contingent	   linguistic	  
convention.	   	   If	   a	   priori	   truths	   are	   “true	   by	   definition,”	   and	  
definitions	  are	  contingent	  linguistic	  conventions,	  then	  a	  priori	  
truths	   are	   “made	   true”	   contingently	   by	   us,	   viz.	   through	   our	  
contingent	  assignment	  of	  intension	  to	  a	  word.	  	  However,	  even	  
if	   a	   priori	   truths	   are	   true	   merely	   by	   definition,	   this	   fails	   to	  
account	   for	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   form	   of	   a	   proposition	   is	  
presupposed	   by	   and	   independent	   of	   its	   expression	   in	   a	  
language.	  
If	   the	   above	   observations	   are	   correct,	   any	   case	   for	  
naturalism	   will	   require	   for	   its	   success	   the	   very	   epistemic	  
resources	   which	   naturalism	   disallows.	   	   Hence,	   a	   case	   for	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